February 2022 was the 50^th anniversary of President Richard Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China—the first state visit of an American president to China.  The 1972 visit capped years of negotiations between the US and the PRC over the terms for establishment of diplomatic relations.  Those negotiations were intense, secret, and freighted with consequence for both nations, and they are the subject of today’s DiscussingTerms post.

Background

In January 1967, Henry Kissinger was in Prague meeting with Antonín Šnejdárek, the former head of Czech intelligence operations in Germany who was then director of the country’s Institute of International Politics and Economics [1].  During their conversation, Šnejdárek made an interesting conjecture, “Despite their wild talk, the Maoists might turn out to be more flexible toward the U.S. than their opponents (the USSR).”  Šnejdárek’s essential point was that the United States might be able to “flip” the Chinese Communists and score the biggest diplomatic coup of the post-World War II era.  In that sense, the PRC was already in play, the United States government had merely failed to realize and act on that insight.

By the late 1960s, both Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had a vision of rapprochement with China.  Nixon wrote a famous essay for Foreign Affairs in October 1967 in which he stated, “Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors.”  Similarly, Kissinger said (through New York Governor and 1968 presidential candidate Nelson Rockefeller for whom Kissinger acted as a sometime speech writer and advisor) that “aiding or encouraging the self-isolation of so great a people” would hurt American interests, and “in a subtle triangle with communist China and the Soviet Union, we can ultimately improve our relations with each—as we test the will for peace of both [2].”

The Nixon administration’s goal was to triangulate between China and the Soviet Union with the hope of improving America’s position regarding its two Cold War adversaries.  In addition, Nixon hoped that China could be encouraged to help the US bring an end to its ongoing war with North Vietnam.

What caused China to be receptive to rapprochement?  Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong had two goals [2].  First, with the death of Stalin in 1953, China had begun a long and agonizing split from the Soviet Union.  By the late 1960s, Mao saw the USSR as a more significant threat to the PRC with which it shared a border than the distant government of the United States.  Second, Mao had begun the Cultural Revolution in 1966 as a movement to purge the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese society of people who did not adhere to Mao’s view of Communism (i.e., to rid China of the influence of the USSR).  But, the Cultural Revolution had come at a terrible cost to the PRC with more than one million deaths and more than 20 million victims of political persecution [3].  By the late 1960s, Mao wanted to bring this chaotic period of Chinese history to a close; improving relations with Western countries was a mechanism to transition away from the Cultural Revolution.

Preliminaries

By the end of the 1960s, the time was ripe for negotiations between America and China, but how was that to happen?  In 1969, President Nixon began to send out feelers regarding improvement of Sino-American relations.  Nixon met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and Prime Minister Ion Maurer, saying, “One must understand that Asia cannot have peace or solve its problems without recognition of China’s existence and drawing China into negotiations [4].”  In a separate conversation with US Ambassador Walter Stoessel at the White House, Nixon suggested a pretext to begin a new dialog, “You know the next time you are at a social gathering in Warsaw, if the Chinese ambassador your counterpart is there, I would suggest you walk up and say hello to him [5].”

Nixon’s message through Stoessel was delivered to the Chinese delegation.  Two meetings were held in Warsaw.  The dialog through Stoessel and the State Department became the front door of Sino-American communication [6].  However, President Nixon did not depend exclusively on Stoessel; he had an alternative mechanism of dialog available to him.  During a trip to Asia, Nixon had met with Pakistani President Yahya Khan and asked him to act as an intermediary between the US and the PRC [2].  Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai consented to the arrangement, and Nixon had a back channel to complement Stoessel’s front door.  As negotiation continued, the Pakistani route would become the far more important channel of communication.

In November 1970, a message for Nixon came back through Yahya Khan.  The message was written by Zhou and Mao who favored warming relations with the US and by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Part, who favored rapprochement not with the US but with the USSR.  It said, “Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an unalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of [the] United States for the last fifteen years.  Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever.  In order to discuss the subject of vacation of China’s territory, called Taiwan, a special envoy from Pres. Nixon will be most welcome in Peking [2].”  In one step, the Chinese had put the subject of Sino-American relations in-play and expressed their precondition for improved relations—US withdrawal of support for Taiwan.  Interestingly, no mention was made of the Vietnam War which the PRC did not consider an impediment to at least talking about improved relations with the US.

Kissinger’s First Visit to China

Following the Chinese invitation, Kissinger met with US ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland.  He asked Farland to coordinate a trip for Kissinger to Asia with a stopover in Islamabad.  The proximity of Pakistan to China would allow the possibility of a face-to-face meeting with Chinese representatives. 

The story used to cover Kissinger’s arrival and then disappearance from Islamabad in July 1971 was that Kissinger had fallen ill and required a few days of rest to recover.  However, far from being incapacitated, Kissinger immediately departed Islamabad for China to meet Zhou.  Kissinger was accompanied by US NSC wunderkind Winston Lord, as well as John H. Holdridge and Dick Smyser from NSC, and two Secret Service agents.  Kissinger had completely excluded State from the most significant diplomatic effort of the Nixon administration.

Both sides prepared thoroughly.  Holdridge had prepared numerous briefing books which Kissinger reviewed in advance.  The Chinese side formulated 8 “Basic Principles” which they communicated to the Americans [2]:

• Removal of US military forces from Taiwan and the Straits as a precondition for improvement of Sino-American relations
• Taiwan would remain a Chinese territory; no outside interference would be permitted
• Taiwan would be reintegrated into China peacefully—this was a concession to the United States, indicating a lack of belligerence on the part of the PRC
• Opposition to any “two China” policy.  (This policy would quickly lead to the admission of the PRC to the United Nations and the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN, although Kissinger could not know how quickly.)
• Acceptance to the first 3 principles was a precondition to establishment of diplomatic relations.
• China promised not to initiate the question of UN representation as long as the United States did not advance a two China policy.
• Resumption of trade would be contingent on US troop withdrawals from Taiwan.
• The PRC intended to push the US to withdraw forces from Vietnam, Korea, and Japan.

The differences in American and Chinese approaches to the negotiation appeared in this first negotiation session and would continue through the entire process of the Opening.  The two approaches can be summarized:

• US Approach:  The American side was guided by Antonín Šnejdárek’s insight discussed above.  They felt that many things would be possible once dialog had started.  As a result, the US side was eager to get to the bargaining table.  They were not initially as concerned about the details of the negotiation, believing that opportunities would appear as discussion continued.  The strength of this approach is that it allowed the US side to overcome what would have been large obstacles if they had been more focused on existing relationships and agreements.  The weaknesses of this approach are that:  1) it caused them to imagine that the Chinese side would take actions that it had no intention of taking and 2) it left a legacy of issues (such as Taiwan) that were not carefully thought out at the time and would return to cause problems for Sino-American relations in the years and decades following.
• Chinese Approach:  The Chinese side was wary of the US based on previous negotiation experience.  One small but significant slight had occurred when US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had refused to shake Zhou Enlai’s hand at the 1954 negotiation in Geneva regarding French withdrawal from Vietnam.  More importantly, the Chinese felt that the US had not delivered on its commitments within the 1954 agreement on Vietnam.  As a result, the Chinese side was extremely concerned about details and sought to tie the Americans down with precise language to ensure US performance.  The strength of this approach is that it protected the Chinese bottom line and ensured that the PRC got most of what it was looking for without conceding much, if anything.  The Chinese approach does not seem to have had any significant weaknesses.  One interesting side effect of the approach was that the political stresses stemming from the internal dialog about what China wanted from the Americans in all probability led to the “Lin Biao Incident,” in which the leading advocate of Sino-Soviet rapprochement fled the PRC, dying in a mysterious plane crash.

Announcing the Breakthrough

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon appeared on a live television broadcast to announce the success of Kissinger’s initial trip and the resulting invitation for Nixon to visit China.  This was the first occasion on which many stake holders would learn just how far the US administration had already pushed the process of rapprochement.  Nixon’s statement included the text of the invitation which stated:

Premier Zhou Enlai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.

Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of China, Premier Zhou Enlai, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.

The text of the invitation had been carefully crafted to avoid the impression that either side was too eager for the meeting.  There was honor for Nixon to be invited and for the PRC to issue the invitation.  Nixon was aware that the surprise revelation would create numerous political brush fires that would need to be smothered in the ensuing weeks and months.  In anticipation, Nixon said in his televised statement, “Our action, in seeking a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China, will not be at the expense of our old friends.”

Two stake holders with large amounts at risk were Taiwan and the Soviet Union.  From contemporaneous records, it is clear that Nixon and Kissinger had already decided to give China what it wanted regarding Taiwan.  The main dilemma from the point of view of the US administration was how to pitch this concession to Taiwan and to the US China lobby.  Nixon’s solution was to obscure the true scope of the diplomatic defeat to Taiwan.  On example is his statement in a January 1972 interview on the eve of his visit to China [8].  He told Dan Rather and a US national audience, “Under the circumstances (of Taiwan’s recent removal from the UN), however, we will go to the People’s Republic (of China), we will have this relationship (between the US and China) normalized on the basis that I have just described, but we will continue also our relations with Taiwan, and we will continue our defense agreement.”

His approach to the Soviet Union was comparatively honest.  He and Kissinger had continually stressed to the Chinese that it was not the US goal to turn the PRC into an ally against the Soviets.  Nixon made the same point to the Soviets.  As bitter a pill as it was, the Soviets seem to have largely accepted this line [2].  Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko said that the Soviet side had no objection to Sino-American rapprochement as long as they did not gang up on the USSR.

In October, Kissinger visited China for a second time, but without a veil of secrecy.  Kissinger and Zhou discussed major issues to the rapprochement, secondary issues, and technical issues (such as the presence on Chinese soil of the President’s Secret Service detail).  February 1972 was set for Nixon’s visit to China.  Zhou continued to refuse help on Vietnam.  And, they discussed the conflict between India and Pakistan.  The US viewed the conflict as a strategic conflict that the Soviet Union was fomenting, while China views it as a regional conflict and saw no reason to become involved.

The Summit

President Nixon, his wife Pat, and the US team left Washington on Thursday February 17, 1972.  They traveled in stages, arriving on Monday February 21, to minimize jet lag.  Upon arrival, Nixon and Kissinger met with Mao and Zhou at Mao’s home in the Imperial City of Beijing.  It was an extraordinary convergence of power:  Nixon the head of one of the world’s superpowers at the peak of his political strength and Mao the leader of the world’s most populous nation and newest nuclear power.

Over the course of the ensuing seven days, Nixon would have the opportunity to meet with Chinese leaders, chiefly Zhou, to discuss many aspects of Sino-American relations.  There were no significant revelations.  Kissinger’s two trips had fully covered the ground of Taiwan, Vietnam, India/Pakistan, and Japan.  What Nixon’s trip accomplished was to allow the American public, Chinese citizens, and the people of the world to consider what the new relationship would mean.  In that sense, Nixon, Mao, Kissinger, and Zhou were acting out the new relationship—signaling the change through the television in the way that ancient governments had publicized changes with handbills posted on walls or through the words of the town crier.

The last task in Sino-American rapprochement (at least as far as Nixon could realize it through summitry) was the drafting of the summit communiqué—a task that Kissinger took on for the US and Qiao Guanhua oversaw for the PRC.  Both sides took careful interest in the document with significant horse trading between Kissinger and Qiao.

The 16-paragraph communiqué included the following text which summarized the US position on Taiwan:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

By the time these words were written, Taiwan had already lost its seat in the United Nations.  The last US soldier left Taiwan on May 3, 1979.

Results of Rapprochement

In a few short months, the US and the PRC had begun to chart a new path for their relations.  From Mao and Zhou’s point of view, what they wanted was relatively simple in expression if not in accomplishment.  The PRC wanted to reduce the US role as a military and diplomatic power in the Pacific and to forestall the reemergence of Japan as an Asian military power.  If these things were accomplished, the PRC wanted to establish normal economic and diplomatic ties with the US.

The US’s view of the future relationship was considerably more complex.  Winston Lord wrote two position papers outlining numerous possible changes to Sino-American relations [2].  The list of possible strategic gains through the relationship included:

• Through triangulation, the Soviets would be encouraged to be more pliant on arms control and European security issues
• Chinese could be encouraged to support the Paris peace talks and place pressure on North Vietnam in the negotiation
• China could encourage a reduction of the conflict between India and Pakistan
• China could stop funding Communist insurgencies in Asia

In the event, China was unhelpful in Paris and unhelpful in the India-Pakistan conflict [9].  The major US win was through détente with the Soviet Union.  US-Chinese rapprochement did catalyze the improvement of US-Soviet relations.  In May 1972, the US and the USSR signed the SALT agreement, the agreement limiting nuclear arms.  (Earlier treaties had all covered special topics, for instance 1963’s Limited Test Ban Treaty and 1968’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The SALT agreement specifically limited the number of missiles the US and USSR could deploy.  It represented a true limit on the nuclear arms race between the superpowers.)

In 2022, it is possible to suggest that the major accomplishment of US-Chinese rapprochement was economic normalization.  The United States’ largest trading partner is China (total 2017 volume:  $635B), and China’s largest trading partner is the United States.  It’s easy to think about that in terms of soybeans and iPhones, but it means so much more.  The trade in agricultural and technical items is based on people-to-people connections that strengthen every year.  In that sense, Nixon’s trip 50 years ago was an investment in the future that has paid off handsomely.

Security issues remain sticking points with the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea being two major foci of concern.  Taiwan remains independent of China, though tensions in the Strait remain strong.  The US remains a Pacific military power in 2022, attempting to hold together a coalition of smaller Asian nations, including Japan and South Korea.  In the end, perhaps the approach of pushing security issues down the road was part of the wisdom of Nixon’s strategy.  Security was too big and complex to be solved at the 1972 summit or even in the ensuing five decades.  By working to find 16 paragraphs that both nations could sign, the US and China were able to move into a new future together, free of at least some of the problems of their old relationship.

[1] Ferguson, Niall.  Kissinger, 1923-1968, The Idealist, Penguin (2015).

[2] Tudda, C.  A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972, LSU Press (2012).

[3] Walder, A.G.  “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971,” Social Science History, Volume 38 , Issue 3-4 , Fall/Winter 2014 , pp. 513-539.

[4] United States Department of State.  “Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu,” Memorandum of Conversation, Bucharest, August 2, 1969.

[5] “Nixon’s China Game,” American Experience, Season 12, Episode 7, aired Feb. 1, 2000.

[6] In describing Stoessel’s approach to the Chinese, Zhou famously said, “We have found the door; it is time to knock on it, and here is the knock.”

[7] “Richard Nixon Announces He Will Visit China, July 15, 1971,” china.usc.edu/richard-nixon-announces-he-will-visit-china-july-15-1971

[8] Nixon, R.  “A Conversation with the President,” interview with Dan Rather of CBS, Jan. 2, 1972.

[9] Tudda points out that the US’s stated aim was for China to become involved in the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971.  The US didn’t get what it wanted when it greenlit Chinese involvement, but perhaps the US was better off.  It’s a little unclear how having three militaries deployed and active in South Asia would have been an improvement over two.  So, maybe Nixon and Kissinger got what they needed, rather than what they wanted.

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